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FOURTH AMENDMENT-ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS OBTAINED
DURING ILLEGAL DETENTION
Dunaway v. New York, 99 S. Ct. 2248 (1979).
INTRODUCTION
In Dunaway v. New York,' the Supreme Court
decided two related fourth amendment issues.
First, the Court held that an involuntary detention
of an individual by police merely for investigatory
purposes and without probable cause violated the
fourth amendment.2 The Court implied that a
detention is involuntary when police officers do not
inform the individual of his freedom to leave and
when they intend to restrain the individual should
he attempt to leave. Second, the Court held that a
confession obtained during an illegal seizure is not
admissible where the causal connection between
the illegality of the seizure and the confession is
unbroken. The Court stated that Miranda warnings
in themselves do not remove the taint of an illegal
detention. Applying a multifactor causal-connec-
tion test, the Court held that incriminating state-
ments given during custody were inadmissible
when the confession was obtained only hours after
the detention, when no intervening events oc-
curred, and when the police intended the detention
to be an expedition for evidence.
In framing each of these holdings, the Court
relied upon familiar doctrines and precedent. How-
ever, the Court also drew new distinctions. In
defining custody, the Court placed new emphasis
on the intentions of police. The Court also distin-
guished the situations in which it will define the
reasonableness requirement of the fourth amend-
ment in terms of probable cause rather than a
balancing of opposing interests. In deciding the
admissibility of Dunaway's statements, the Court
clarified the use of the exclusionary rule to effec-
tuate fourth amendment guarantees.
1 99 S. Ct. 2248 (1979). Justice Brennan wrote for the
majority. Justices White and Stevens filed concurring
opinions. Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in
which Chief Justice Burger joined.
2 The pertinent part of the fourth amendment states:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons
... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause .... U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
FACTS AND CASE HISTORY
During their investigation of a robbery and mur-
der, Rochester police learned from an informant
that a jail inmate awaiting trial could supply a
lead implicating Dunaway. Police questioned the
inmate but did not obtain "'enough information
to get a warrant' for ... [Dunaway's] arrest."3
Nonetheless, the officer in charge of the case or-
dered detectives to "pick up" Dunaway. The de-
tectives found Dunaway at a neighbor's house.
Police did not tell Dunaway that he was under
arrest and that they would have physically re-
strained him had he attempted to leave.4 At their
headquarters, police placed Dunaway in an inter-
rogation room and questioned him after reciting
the Miranda warnings. Dunaway waived his right
to counsel. Within an hour after arriving at the
police station, Dunaway made statements and
drew sketches which implicated him in the crime.
5
The following day, Dunaway made a more com-
plete second statement. 6
At trial in the Monroe County Court, Dunaway
moved to suppress the statements and sketches.
The court denied the motion, and the jury returned
a guilty verdict. This conviction was affirmed with-
out opinion by the Appellate Division of the Fourth
Department and the New York Court of Appeals.
7
The United States Supreme Court then granted
certiorari. 8 The Court remanded the case to the
lower courts for further consideration in accord-
ance with its decision in Brown v. Illinois.9 On
399 S. Ct. at 2251.
4Id. (citing People v. Dunaway, slip op. at 116, 117
app. (Monroe Cty. Ct., N.Y. March 11, 1977)).
99 S. Ct. at 2251.
6 1d. at 2251 n.2.
7 People v. Dunaway, 42 App. Div. 2d 689, 346
N.Y.S.2d 779 (1973), afld, 35 N.Y.2d 741, 390 N.E.2d
646, 361 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1974).
8 Dunaway v. New York, 422 U.S. 1053 (1975).
9422 U.S. 590 (1975). Brown involved a situation very
similar to that presented in Dunaway. During their inves-
tigation of a murder, Chicago police arrested Brown at
gunpoint without probable cause and without a warrant.
Police later testified that they made the arrest for inves-
tigatory purposes. At the station, police advised Brown
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remand, the New York Court of Appeals sent the
case back to the Monroe County Court to obtain
factual findings regarding the circumstances of
Dunaway's detention.
After a supplemental suppression hearing, the
trial court granted Dunaway's motion to suppress
the statements and sketches. The trial court found
that Dunaway had not voluntarily appeared at
police headquarters in response to a police re-
quest.10 The court noted that Brown indicated "dis-
dain for custodial questioning without probable
cause to arrest," and found the factual requisites of
probable cause lacking." Finally, the trial court
held that the Miranda warnings did not purge the
taint of Dunaway's illegal seizure and that the
prosecution had not demonstrated that the confes-
sion was attenuated from the illegal detention.'
2
The New York Appellate Division reversed the
county court on two separate grounds. First, in
accordance with the New York Court of Appeals
decision in People v. Morales,'5 the appellate division
of his Miranda ights. After police informed Brown of their
knowledge of his participation in a previous shooting
incident, Brown confessed to his participation in the
murder. The trial court denied Brown's motion to sup-
press the confession as being the fruit of an illegal seizure,
and the jury returned a guilty verdict. The Illinois Su-
preme Court affirmed, holding that the Miranda warnings
rendered Brown's statements admissible despite the ille-
gality of his arrest. The United States Supreme Court
reversed, stating that if Miranda warnings by themselves
rendered a confession given during an illegal arrest ad-
missible, police would have no incentive to avoid fourth
amendment violations. In order to determine whether
Brown's statements were a product of his free will so as
to dissipate the taint of his illegal arrest, the Court
employed a multifactor test. Since Brown confessed
within two hours after his detention with no intervening
event of significance, and since the arrest was merely for
investigatory purposes, the Court found Brown's confes-
sion inadmissible as an exploitation of the illegal arrest.
10 99 S. Ct. at 2252 (citing People v. Dunaway, slip op.
at 117 app. (Monroe Cty. Ct., N.Y. March 11, 1977)).
" Id. at 2252-53 (citing People v. Dunaway, slip op. at
118 app. (Monroe Cty. Ct., N.Y. March 11, 1977)).2 Id. at 2251-52 (citing People v. Dunaway, slip op. at
117 app. (Monroe Cty. Ct., N.Y. March 11, 1977)).
13 22 N.Y.2d 55, 238 N.E.2d 307, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898
(1968). In Morales, the New York Court of Appeals con-
fronted the issue of whether a detention without probable
cause for purposes of investigatory questioning was un-
reasonable under the fourth amendment. New York po-
lice had detained Morales on mere suspicion of his in-
volvement in a murder and questioned him at the police
station. In order to determine the reasonableness of this
seizure, the court of appeals balanced the factors of
Morales' privacy interest, the seriousness of the crime,
and the degree of suspicion possessed by police. The court
found that police could legally detain and question
a person on reasonable suspicion if conditions were
controlled to protect the person's fifth and sixth
amendment rights. Thus, the court held Duna-
way's detention legal. Second, relying on the fact
that police had not threatened or abused Dunaway
while he was in custody, the appellate division
found that even if Dunaway's detention was illegal,
the taint was attenuated sufficiently to permit the
admission of Dunaway's statements into
evidence. 4 The New York Court of Appeals did
not grant Dunaway an appeal.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the
New York Appellate Division on both issues pre-
sented in the case. The Court found first that
Dunaway's detention without probable cause vio-
lated his fourth amendment rights. The Court
found "little doubt that petitioner was 'seized' in
the Fourth Amendment sense .... ,,5 In reaching
this result, the Court relied on the trial court's
supplemental suppression hearing finding that
"this case does not involve a situation where the
defendant voluntarily appeared at police head-
quarters in response to a request of police."' 6
Since Dunaway's detention was involuntary, the
Court next considered whether the seizure was
reasonable within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. The state argued, on the basis of Terry
v. Ohio,'7 that since Dunaway's seizure was not a
formal arrest, the fourth amendment requirement
of reasonableness was satisfied by the reasonable
suspicion of police that Dunaway possessed knowl-
edge of a crime.' 8 The state thus urged the Court
to employ the Terry balance test of reasonableness'
9
held Morales' seizure reasonable because the public in-
terest in prosecuting the murder outweighed the invasion
of Morales' privacy incurred by the custodial interroga-
tion. However, the court also emphasized that police had
conducted the questioning under carefully controlled
conditions protecting the individual's fifth and sixth
amendment rights.
1499 S. Ct. at 2253 (citing 61 App. Div. 2d 299, 302,
402 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492 (1978)).
'5 99 S. Ct. at 2253.
"Id. at 2252 (citing People v. Dunaway, slip op. at
117 app. (Monroe Cty. Ct., N.Y. March I1, 1977)).
17In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court held
that limited stop-and-frisk searches conducted by police
on the basis of reasonable suspicion did not violate the
fourth amendment.
1' 99 S. Ct. at 2254.
19 In Terry, the Court determined reasonableness by
balancing the violation of individual privacy involved in
the search and the opposing interests in crime prevention
and in the police officer's safety. 392 U.S. at 22-27.
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to custodial interrogations, rather than the stan-
dard of probable cause applicable to arrests.
Distinguishing Dunaway's detention from the
types of seizures warranting the Terry balance test,
the Court rejected the state's arguments. The Court
stated that Terry had departed from the general
rule that seizures must be based on probable cause.
The Court noted that Terry had defined a special
category of seizures so substantially less intrusive
than arrests that the general rule of probable cause
could be replaced by a balancing test.20 The Court
pointed out that it had refused to expand this
special category beyond limited weapons frisks2'
and limited, brief questioning.22 Since Dunaway
was taken from a neighbor's home to a police car,
transported to a police station, never informed that
he was free to go, and would have been restrained
by police had he attempted to leave, the Court
found that Dunaway's seizure was not "even
roughly analogous to the narrowly defined intru-
sions involved in Terry and its progeny. ' ' 2a The
Court concluded that if Dunaway's seizure was
added to the limited instances warranting the use
of the Terry balancing test, the general rule that
fourth amendment seizures are reasonable only if
based upon probable cause would be rendered
nugatory.2
The Court noted that since Terry, it had held
detentions of the same magnitude as Dunaway's
seizure to be unconstitutional unless supported by
probable cause. The Court first stated that in Davis
v. Mississippi,25 it had held that "nothing is more
clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant
to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal
security of our citizenry, whether these intrusions
be termed 'arrests' or 'investigatory detentions.'
26
Thus, since Davis' detention was without probable
cause, the Davis Court found that it violated the
fourth amendment. The Court in Dunaway next
pointed out that in Brown v. Illinois,27 it had simi-
larly condemned an arrest made solely for investi-
gatory purposes and without probable cause. Thus,
20 99 S. Ct. at 2255.
21 See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977);
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
22 See Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
23 99 S. Ct. at 2256.
24 id.
2 394 U.S. 721 (1969). In Davis, the admissibility of
fingerprints taken from a suspect detained during the
investigatory process without probable cause was at issue.
26 99 S. Ct. at 2257 (citing 394 U.S. at 726-27).
2 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
the Dunaway Court concluded that "detention for
custodial interrogation-regardless of its label-
intrudes so severely on interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the
traditional safeguards against illegal arrest.,
28
Having determined that Dunaway's detention
was illegal, the Court next considered whether the
circumstances surrounding Dunaway's statements
and sketches sufficiently dissipated the taint of his
illegal detention so as to render the incriminating
evidence admissible. In deciding this issue, the
Court followed its reasoning in Brown. The Court
first reiterated that Miranda warnings in themselves
do not render statements given during an illegal
detention admissible. The Court again noted that
use of the exclusionary rule "to effectuate the
Fourth Amendment... serves interests and policies
that are distinct from those it serves under the Fifth
.... ,9 One policy goal of the exclusionary rule is
to deter fourth amendment violations. Quoting
from Brown, the Court stated that such deterrence
could not be achieved "[i]f Miranda warnings, by
themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an
unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton
and purposeful the Fourth Amendment violation
... ."30 Since involuntary statements would be ex-
cluded from evidence under the fifth amendment,
the Court stated that "voluntariness" is merely a
threshold requirement for fourth amendment anal-
ysis.
31
Again following Brown, the Court in Dunaway
indicated that the relevant inquiry in the fourth
amendment analysis is whether the contested state-
ments were obtained by exploiting the illegality
of the detention. 2 The Brown Court had established
a multifactor test focusing on the causal connection
between the illegality of the seizure and the con-
fession. The factors of this test include "[t]he tem-
poral proximity of the arrest and the confession,
the presence of intervening circumstances,.., and,
particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the of-
ficial misconduct .... "33
Applying Brown's multifactor test, the Dunaway
Court found that since Dunaway confessed without
any intervening event of significance and since the
police had made the seizure in the hope that
something might turn up, Dunaway's statements
28 99 S. Ct. at 2258.
2 Id. (quoting 422 U.S. at 602).
3 Id. at 2258-59.
3i Id. at 2259.32
id.
3 Id. (quoting 422 U.S. at 602-03). The burden of
showing admissibility rests on the prosecution.
[Vol. 70
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were inadmissible. The Court stated that the ap-
pellate division had erred in relying on the facts
that the police did not physically abuse Dunaway
and that their conduct was highly protective of
Dunaway's fifth amendment rights. The Court
stated that such reliance confused the voluntariness
requirement of the fifth amendment with the
causal-connection test established in Brown.m Thus,
the Court concluded that Dunaway's confession
was obtained by the exploitation of his illegal
detention. Hence, in order to deter similar future
fourth amendment violations, the Court found
Dunaway's statements inadmissible.s
Two Justices filed concurring opinions in Duna-
way. Justice White pointed out that the key prin-
ciple of compliance with the fourth amendment is
reasonableness, which is determined by a balancing
of competing interests. He stated further that while
the balancing of interests must be done on a cate-
gorical basis in order to give courts and law enforce-
ment officials a workable rule, the general rule of
probable cause should not preclude recognition of
extraordinary private or public interests nor certain
generic exceptions where more flexibility is essen-
tial. Thus, Justice White implied that the test of
reasonableness need not always be satisfied by
probable cause. However, in the circumstances of
Dunaway, he found the police conduct similar
enough to an arrest to warrant the standard of
probable cause.ss
WhileJustice White's concurrence concerned the
question ofwhen the fourth amendment is violated,
Justice Stevens' concurrence discussed the admis-
sibility of evidence once a fourth amendment vi-
olation has already been determined. First, Justice
Stevens pointed out the ambiguity in two of the
factors employed in the Brown causal-connection
test. He noted that the temporal proximity between
the illegal seizure and the confession is unreliable
in determining whether the statements are a prod-
uct of free will because a long detention may be a
more serious exploitation than a short one, and a
quick confession may have little to do with the fact
of detention itself. He also argued that the fla-
grancy of the official misconduct factor in the
Brown test was relevant "only insofar as it has a
tendency to motivate the defendant." a He stated
that an individual would be affected by the outer
manifestations of police conduct, whether these
manifestations are violent or polite, regardless of
' 99 S. Ct. at 2259-60.
35 Id. at 2260.
' Id. (White, J., concurring).
'7 Id. at 2260 (Stevens, J., concurring).
whether the acting police officer "thinks he has
probable cause or knows that he does not."' ss Thus,
Stevens concluded that "the admissibility question
will turn on the causal relationship between that
violation and the defendant's subsequent confes-
sion." 39 Second, Justice Stevens argued that the
exclusion of evidence illegally obtained must be
determined through the use of objective criteria.
He reasoned that since the exclusionary rule is
designed to motivate all law enforcement officers
and not to punish the errant policeman, the po-
liceman's subjective good faith should not be rele-
vant to the application of the exclusionary rule.
40
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion disagreed
with the majority's disposition of both the deten-
tion and admissibility issues. First, Justice Rehn-
quist argued that Dunaway's detention was not
involuntary. He noted that when the police asked
Dunaway if he would accompany them to the
station for questioning, Dunaway had said that he
would.4 Rehnquist contended that the test for
seizure was actual physical restraint.4 2 He empha-
sized that police had not given any indication to
Dunaway that he was under arrest nor had they
used any physical force. Rehnquist differed with
the majority's reliance on the fact that the police
would have restrained Dunaway had he attempted
to leave. Rehnquist argued that the "unexpressed
intentions of police officers as to hypothetical situ-
ations have little bearing on the question whether
the police conduct, objectively viewed, restrained
petitioner's liberty by show of force or authority."43
Thus, Rehnquist concluded that since police did
not compel Dunaway to accompany them to the
station, he was not involuntarily detained.
Justice Rehnquist next argued that even if Dun-
away's detention was illegal, the fourth amend-
ment did not require the suppression of Dunaway's
statements and sketches. Noting that the Court
had not assigned equal weight to the three factors
in the Brown causal-connection test, Rehnquist
placed the greatest importance on the "purpose
and flagrancy of police misconduct" factors of the
test. He contended that where police have acted in
good faith and not in a flagrant manner, a confes-
sion made during an illegal detention should be
3 Id.
39 1d.
4o Id. at 2260-61.
41 Id. at 2262 (citing People v. Dunaway, slip op. at
89-90 app. (Monroe Cty. Ct., N.Y. March 11, 1977)




admissible if the Miranda warnings are given and if
the statement is voluntary within the meaning of
the fifth amendment. Rehnquist implied that
"good faith" meant reliance by police on the state
court's current interpretation of search and seizure
law and that "flagrant manner" referred to the
police officer's treatment of the individual during
the seizure." Since the New York Court of Appeals
in People v. Morales" had held custodial questioning
on less than probable cause permissible, Rehnquist
argued that Rochester police had acted in good-
faith reliance on state law. Since police did not
physically abuse Dunaway during the seizure,
Rehnquist contended that their conduct was not
flagrant. Thus, he concluded that Dunaway's Mi-
randa statements "were of sufficient free will to
purge the primary taint of his alleged illegal deten-
tion.
46
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IssuE
In deciding whether the actions of police violated
Dunaway's fourth amendment rights, the Court
found first that Dunaway had been seized, and
second, that this seizure without probable cause
did not attain the standards of reasonableness pre-
scribed by the fourth amendment.
The facts of Dunaway presented the Court with
a custody issue which represents a common occur-
rence in law enforcement practice. The police re-
quested an individual to come to the station for
questioning; they did not intend to arrest him, but
would not have permitted him to leave until ques-
tions were answered. The majority and the dissen-
ters in Dunaway differed as to the standard of
custody that should be applied in order to deter-
mine whether an individual who comes to the
station for questioning under these circumstances
is seized within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment.
While the majority's determination of the cus-
tody issue largely relied on the trial court's finding
that Dunaway did not voluntarily appear at police
headquarters, two dimensions of a test for custody
can be discerned from the Court's opinion. First,
the Court noted an objective dimension which tests
actual restraint of the individual's freedom.47 The
44 Id. at 2263.
45 22 N.Y.2d 55, 238 N.E.2d 307, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898
(1968).
46 99 S. Ct. at 2264 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47 99 S. Ct. at 2253 n.6. Quoting from Terry, the Court
stated that "whenever a police officer accosts an individ-
ual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized'
that person." Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968)).
Court had established this dimension of custody in
Miranda where it equated custody with any instance
where an individual is "deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way."' s Second, the Court
implied that the test for custody also contains a
subjective dimension. Noting that a request to
come to the police station may carry with it an
implication of obligation and may be an awesome
experience,49 the Court indicated that this dimen-
sion might include the subjective belief of the
individual. The Court also implied that the subjec-
tive dimension may include the intentions of police.
In finding Dunaway's detention involuntary, the
Court relied on the facts that police did not inform
Dunaway that he was free to go and that the police
would have restrained Dunaway had he attempted
to leave. Apparently, the Court inferred from these
facts that the police intended Dunaway's confine-
ment in the station to constitute custody.
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that
only the actual, objective circumstances of the
detention should be considered in the determina-
tion of custody. Citing Terry v. Ohio,5° he stated that
the test of seizure was whether a police officer "by
means of physical force or show of authority, has
in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen. "5i
Thus, Justice Rehnquist argued that whatever the
detectives might have done if Dunaway had tried
to leave was irrelevant.52
In previous decisions, the Court has utilized both
the subjective and the objective dimensions in or-
der to determine the existence of custody. In Orozco
v. Texas,ss the Court seemed to emphasize the
subjective dimension. In Orozco, police went to the
defendant's home a few hours after a shooting and
asked Orozco about his ownership of a gun and his
presence at the scene of the crime. Although police
did not physically restrain Orozco nor tell him that
he was under arrest, they testified that during the
questioning, Orozco "was not free to go where he
pleased but was 'under arrest.' "5 Since police thus
intended to restrain Orozco, the Court found that
his detention constituted custody, requiring the
Miranda warnings.
In Cupp v. Murphy,ss the Court seemed to favor
8 "Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
9 99 S. Ct. at 2253 n.6 (quoting ALI MODEL CODE OF
PREARRAIONMENT PROCEDURE § 2.01(3) (Tentative Draft
no. 1 1966)).
so 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
S1 99 S. Ct. at 2261 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16).
'52 Id. at 2262
394 U.S. 324 (1969).
e Id. at 325.
e412 U.S. 291 (1973).
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the objective dimension of the custody test. In
Cupp, Murphy had voluntarily come to the police
station and police had probable cause to suspect
him of committing a murder. Over the objection
of Murphy, police took fingernail scrapings, pre-
sumably restraining Murphy in the process. Police
then released Murphy and did not arrest him until
one month later. Despite the fact that Murphy had
voluntarily come to the station, the Court held that
Murphy's restraint and detention for the purpose
of taking the samples "against his will constituted
a seizure of his person.
' ss
Since no physical restraint was involved in Dun-
away, the Court's decision seems to place greater
emphasis on the subjective dimension of police
intentions, rather than on the objective dimension
of actual restraint. This implication of Dunaway
threatens to erode a doctrine of custody established
by the circuit courts. These courts have refused to
consider the intentions of police unless they are
manifested to the suspect. In United States v. Hall, 57
the Second Circuit stated that in the "absence of
actual arrest something must be said or done by
the authorities... which indicates that they would
not have heeded a request to depart or allow the
suspect to do so. ' ss Similarly, in Lowe v. United
States, 9 the Ninth Circuit held that custody is
determined not by what the officer or person thinks
but rather by the "officer's statement and acts, the
surrounding circumstances, gauged by a 'reasona-
ble man' test. ' 6" Justice Rehnquist's position in
Dunaway is closely aligned with this doctrine since
he too deems only objective criteria relevant in the
determination of custody.
By emphasizing the unmanifested intention of
police in the test for custody, it would appear that
the Court has shifted the locus of the presumption
of detention from what the individual and an
objective observer readily perceive to what the
police officers intend. Since police often intend to
restrain an individual without actually having to
do so, such a shift places a greater burden on police
to ascertain whether the purpose of their investi-
gation warrants obtaining probable cause before
detaining the individual. If the police have deter-
mined that the answers they seek are important
" Id. at 294.
7 421 F.2d 540 (2d. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
990 (1970).
w 421 F.2d at 545; accord, United States v. Tobin, 429
F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1970).
9407 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1969).
6°Id. at 1397. See also United States v. Kennedy, 573
F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1978); Hicks v. United States, 382
F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
enough to warrant the restraint of an individual
should he attempt to leave, then the police must
have probable cause before transporting an indi-
vidual to the station for questioning.
At the same time, the Court's decision frees the
individual from having to guess whether he is free
to leave at any time or whether he is the target of
investigation. The individual can assume that
when he is detained by police and not advised of
his right to depart, that he is seized and protected
under the fourth amendment.
Such a result is consistent with the Court's prior
decisions in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte6 t and
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce .6 In those cases, the
Court found that stopping an individual's auto-
mobile, either at a checkpoint or at random, for
the purpose of brief questioning, constituted a
seizureen The Court treated these stops as seizures
presumably because the individuals were not free
to depart until they answered questions, although
they were not under formal arrest. Thus, the Court
held that these stops were governed by the fourth
amendment's requirement of reasonableness.
The determination of custody is not a problem
if the individual clearly and voluntarily consents
to be questioned. The Court's decision in Dunaway
helps to refine the parameters of voluntariness. In
Oregon v. Mathiason,64 the Court established that
voluntariness was indicated when the police gave
the individual a choice of where the questioning
would be conducted, and the individual chose the
station. In Dunaway, the Court indicated that giv-
ing an individual only a yes-or-no choice as to
whether he wanted to go to the station does not
give the individual a voluntary choice.
The net result of the Court's treatment of the
custody issue in Dunaway is that police must do one
of three things before legally transporting an indi-
vidual to the police station for questioning: they
must (1) obtain the individual's unequivocal con-
sent to go to the station for questioning; (2) inform
the individual of his right to depart at any time
before or during the interview; or (3) have probable
cause sufficient for an arrest.
It appears that of these three factors, the Court
prefers that police have probable cause before tak-
ing an individual to the station. The majority in
Dunaway devoted a large part of its opinion to
explaining that probable cause, rather than the
61 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
62 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
' United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556
(1976).
6429 U.S. 492 (1977).
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Terry balance test, constitutes the proper standard
of reasonableness under the fourth amendment
where the circumstances of detention closely ap-
proximate arrest. In order to determine why the
Court found probable cause to be the test of rea-
sonableness in Dunaway, the situations in which the
Court has used the balance test should first be
considered.
In several decisions, the Court has balanced the
individual's interest in privacy with the opposing
interest of society in crime prevention. In Terry, the
Court found that the exigencies and dangers sur-
rounding a policeman's questioning of an individ-
ual on the street outweighed the limited intrusion
of a frisk search. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,6
the Court held that the burden on public resources
created by an unchecked rate of Mexican immigra-
tion created a public interest which outweighed
the minor intrusion to individuals involved in the
stopping of their cars to inquire about citizenship.
In Camara v. Municipal Court, s the Court balanced
public and private interests in order to determine
probable cause. The Camara Court found that a
warrant to search dwellings located in a particular
geographical area for building code violations was
sustained by probable cause if the search was jus-
tified by a reasonable governmental interest. 7
By refusing to balance in Dunaway, the Court has
distinguished the kinds of crime prevention situa-
tions which warrant the balance test from those
requiring probable cause. First, the Court has de-
lineated the types of detention which must be
supported by probable cause. In Terry and Martinez-
Fuerte the seizure involved was limited to a roadway
or sidewalk stop and was of brief duration. The
Court admitted that while the fourth amendment
applied in these situations, it found that since the
degree of intrusion upon the individual's privacy
was minimal, the fourth amendment's reasonable-
ness requirement could be satisfied by mere suspi-
cion. In contrast, the seizure in Dunaway involved
a nonarrest detention in a police station. By hold-
ing that such a detention requires more than mere
suspicion, the Court has indicated that station-
house detentions for purposes of investigation in-
volve the same serious degree of invasion upon
privacy as does an arrest itself. Thus, since arrests
require probable cause, investigatory detentions
similarly are not reasonable unless supported by
probable cause.
65 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
66 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
6 Id. at 539.
Second, the Dunaway Court has implicitly distin-
guished the kinds of police investigations which
require probable cause. The investigations in-
volved in Terry, Martinez-Fuerte, and Camara were
broad in scope. In Martinez-Fuerte and Camara, the
investigations were designed to cast a wide net in
order to catch many violators of specific immigra-
tion laws or building codes. Terry involved the
converse situation in which police observed a par-
ticular individual whom they thought might be
involved in criminal activity, yet no specific crime
motivated the police detention. In each case, the
Court found that a particular public interest war-
ranted such a broadly based, extraordinary police
investigation.
In contrast, Dunaway involved a routine criminal
investigation which was narrow in scope. Police
sought a particular individual in order to solve a
particular crime. The Court's decision in Dunaway
thus indicates that the public interest in routine
investigation and crime prevention does not war-
rant use of the balance test. In his dissent in
Martinez-Fuerte, Justice Brennan warned that the
individual could never win in a balance with the
broad governmental interest in preventing crime.
6
8
A majority of the Court in Dunaway adopted the
same view, warning that the balance test would
swallow the individual's fourth amendment protec-
tions. 69 Since the New York Appellate Division had
found that Dunaway's detention on mere suspicion
was reasonable because "great public interest ex-
isted in solving a brutal crime which had remained
unsolved for a period of almost five months,"' 7 the
Dunaway Court has implied that even heinous
crimes do not mandate seizures on less than prob-
able cause. Thus, the Dunaway decision reinforces
the Court's longstanding position that the fourth
amendment was designed to protect the individual
against the zealous use of police power.
7 1
In sum, Dunaway represents a refinement of the
Court's treatment in Davis and Brown of situations
68 428 U.S. at 570 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9 99 S. Ct. at 2256.
70 61 App. Div. 2d at 303, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
71 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
In Johnson, police had entered a hotel room without a
warrant when they smelled opium. The Court found that
while the police might have had probable cause to believe
that a crime was being committed, they should not have
conducted the search without first obtaining judicial
approval. The Court held that the fourth amendment
protections required that the judgment of the existence
of probable cause be determined by a neutral magistrate
rather than by the officer "engaged in the often compet-
itive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
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where police detain individuals at the police station
for investigatory purposes. The Court again has
found that detentions which approximate arrest
must be supported by probable cause and do not
fall within the special category of police practices
requiring only reasonable suspicion for detention
as delineated in Terry. By holding in Dunaway that
a detention without actual physical restraint by
police approximates arrest, the Court expanded
the situations which trigger the fourth amendment
requirement of probable cause. While police need
not have probable cause before initiating every
encounter with an individual from whom they seek
information, Dunaway indicates that police must
have probable cause before transporting an indi-
vidual to the police station for questioning.
APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
After finding that police had illegally seized
Dunaway, the Court next considered whether Dun-
away's statements and sketches should be excluded
from evidence. Since Dunawav had received the
Miranda warnings and had waived his right to
counsel, the Court confronted a situation where,
but for a violation of Dunaway's fourth amend-
ment rights, the evidence police obtained would
have been admissible under the fifth amendment.
In order to place the Court's application of the
2xclusionary rule in Dunaway in perspective, the
Court's prior interpretations of the rule must be
examined.
When utilizing the exclusionary rule, the Court
has been guided by two policies. First, the rule is
designed to deter unconstitutional police conduct.
The Court has found that the only effective way to
protect constitutional guarantees is to remove po-
lice incentive to disregard the guarantees.72 This is
accomplished by excluding from evidence infor-
mation obtained by illegal means. Second, the rule
is designed to maintain judicial integrity. Since the
admission of illegally obtained evidence implies the
judiciary's approval of conduct securing the evi-
dence, the Court has invoked the exclusionary rule
to close the "doors of the federal courts to any use
of evidence unconstitutionally obtained."7
In situations where evidence, otherwise admissi-
ble, is obtained as a result of an illegal seizure, the
.ourt has previously applied these policies in two
'See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347
(1974).
7'Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. '71, 486
(1963). See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960).
ways. First, in order to effectuate the deterrence
purpose of the rule, the Court has declined to find
that Miranda warnings in themselves render confes-
sions given during an illegal seizure admissible.
The Court's rationale for excluding such evidence
is premised on the notion that the fourth and fifth
amendments serve different interests.74 In Brown,
the Court noted that the Miranda warnings in "no
way inform a person of his Fourth Amendment
rights, including his right to be released from un-
lawful custody.... ,,5 The Brown Court also em-
phasized that if such voluntary confessions made
after illegal arrests were admitted, the illegal con-
duct "would be encouraged by the knowledge that
evidence derived therefrom could well be made
admissible at trial by the simple expedient of giving
Miranda warnings."
7 6
In addition to deterring illegal conduct, the
Court's use of the exclusionary rule is also moti-
vated by concern for the competing interest of
society in law enforcement. This concern manifests
itself through the judicial integrity policy of the
exclusionary rule. The Court has recognized that
although society benefits from the constitutional
guarantees protected by the rule, society also pays
the cost of crime which goes unprosecuted. Thus,
the Court has stated that the exclusionary rule
should not be used to "proscribe the use of illegally
seized evidence in all proceedings or against all
persons." In order to further society's interest in
law enforcement, the Court will not exclude evi-
dence when it appears that, despite illegal police
conduct, the individual has freely decided to make
incriminating statements.
Such admission of free-will statements appears
to be more closely related to the judicial integrity
purpose of the exclusionary rule than to the deter-
rence purpose. If the Court's only objective is to
deter illegal seizures, even statements given of free
will during an illegal detention would be excluded.
Since the Court also is concerned with law enforce-
ment, free-will statements given during an illegal
detention sometimes are admissible. However, such
statements must be sufficiently removed from the
illegal purpose of the seizure so that their admission
into evidence will not imply that the Court con-
dones the illegal conduct. Thus, in choosing be-
tween the competing interest of deterring illegal
police conduct and promoting law enforcement,
7" Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 601.
7 Id. at 601 n.6.
76 Id. at 602.
7 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
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the Court implicitly invokes the judicial integrity
policy of the exclusionary rule. Even though the
exclusion of statements obtained during an illegal
seizure always would serve to deter illegal conduct,
when law enforcement can be served without com-
promising judicial integrity, the Court will admit
illegal detention statements.
In order to determine when illegal detention
statements are sufficiently removed from the ille-
gality of the seizure so as not to compromisejudicial
integrity, the Court has developed a causal-con-
nection test. The Court will admit evidence when
the connection between the illegality and the evi-
dence has become "so attenuated as to dissipate
the taint"78 of the detention.79 In Brown, the Court
recognized the difficulty of determining whether a
confession was the product of an exploitation of
the detention or the product of free will. The Court
noted that the complexities of the human mind
and the diversity of police conduct made the ap-
plication of a talismanic test unrealistic.s0 Thus,
the Court announced a multifactor causal-connec-
tion test in Brown.
81
The Court's application of the exclusionary rule
in Dunaway indicates that the Court sought to
effectuate both the deterrence and judicial integ-
rity policies of the rule. The Court again empha-
sized that if Miranda warnings by themselves were
deemed to render an illegal detention confession
admissible, then police would have little incentive
to avoid violating the fourth amendment.u In
order to determine whether Dunaway's statements
were a product of free will rather than an exploi-
tation of the illegal detention, the Court employed
the Brown multifactor test. The Court found that
since police seized Dunaway in the hope that evi-
dence might turn up and since Dunaway confessed
without any intervening events of significance, his
statements should be excluded from evidence.83
The Dunaway Court's use of the Brown multifac-
tor test demonstrates its intention to weigh system-
atically the many factors which might determine
whether an individual's confessior is suffirientl"
attenuated from the taint of the illegal detention
78 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
7Thus, in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963), the Court established that evidence is not auto-
matically excluded only because it would not have been
obtained but for the illegal police actions.
o Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 603.
s This test consists of the temporal proximity of the
arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening
factors and the purpose and flagrancy of official miscon-
duct.
s' 99 S. Ct. at 2259.
W Id.
so as to warrant the admission of the confession
without compromising judicial integrity. By em-
ploying a specific test, it appears that the Court
seeks to narrow the unenumerated test it used
before Brown, which encompassed a totality of the
circumstances. If the Brown test is to be effective
and produce consistent results, its factors must be
unambiguous. Did the Court's application of the
test in Dunaway help to establish the clarity of its
factors?
The first factor in the test is the temporal prox-
imity between the arrest and the confession. In
both Brown and Dunaway, the Court indicated that
a confession made only hours after the individual
is taken into custody signals exploitation of the
illegal detention. Presumably, the longer the period
i,;.ime an individual has to reflect while in custody,
the more likely it is that his statements will be the
product of free will.8' In his concurring opinion in
Dunaway, Justice Stevens pointed out that this tem-
poral factor may be ambiguous. He noted that a
prolonged detention may be more serious exploi-
tation than a short confinement, and that an im-
mediate confession may have little to do with the
fact of detention itself.85 Thus, the time by which
a confession follows detention may not reliably
indicate whether the individual freely decided to
give statements or whether he felt compelled by
the surrounding circumstances to make such state-
ments.
The second factor of the test consists of the
presence of intervening circumstances. In neither
Brown nor Dunaway did the Court attempt to define
this factor, even though it appears to be important
in the Court's decision in Dunaway.86 By common
definition, an intervening event would break the
causal chain between the illegal detention and the
confession. Two such kinds of events can be in-
ferred from the Court's previous decisions. First,
the nature of some kinds of events occurring sub-
sequent to an illegal detention may serve to vitiate
the taint of illegality surrounding the detention
itself. In Johnson v. Louisiana,7 where Johnson was
illegally arrested without a warrant and identified
The Eighth Circuit has interpreted the temporal
factor to mean that confessions given after many hours of
detention are the product of free will. In United States v.
Rose, 541 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 1976), where Rose had been
arrested for a bank robbery by state officials who carried
a defective warrant, the court held that statements made
40 hours after the arrest were admissible.
5 99 S. Ct. at 2260 (Stevens, J., concurring).
'The Court twice noted that Dunaway confessed
without any intervening event. 99 S. Ct. at 2259, 2260.
87 406 U.S. 356 (1972). The main issue in the case was
the constitutionality of a less than unanimous verdict.
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by the robbery victim in a lineup, the Court held
that the identification evidence was sufficiently
purged of the taint of the illegal arrest because
Johnson had been taken before a magistrate prior
to the lineup.ss Presumably the magistrate found
probable cause for the arrest, thus making John-
son's detention valid at the time the identification
evidence was obtained. A second kind of interven-
ing event is one which serves to demonstrate that
the individual's decision to give a statement sub-
sequent to the original detention is free from the
taint of illegality. Such an event might be the
release from custody. In Wong Sun v. United States,
Wong Sun had been illegally arrested and then
released. Two days later, he returned to police
headquarters and confessed. The Court held that
this sequence of events made the connection be-
tween the arrest and confession so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint.89 Thus, the Court admitted the
confession.
Since Johnson and Wong Sun demonstrate differ-
ing occurrences which break the causal chain,
9
0
further indication by the Court as to the meaning
of intervening circumstances would aid practition-
ers and jurists in the application of this factor. In
United States v. Monti,91 the First Circuit indicated
several intervening factors which the Supreme
Court might enumerate. Monti had made incul-
patory statements first while under arrest and later
during an informal meeting with police. The court
found that Monti's second statements were suffi-
ciently free from any taint associated with the
arrest because 1) Monti had consulted with counsel
before the meeting, 2) the setting of the questioning
had changed to a noncustodial situation, and 3)
Monti himself had urged the second meeting.
The third factor in the causal-connection test
consists of the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct. The members of the Court in Dunaway
debated whether the misconduct factor measured
the degree to which police purposefully violated
the fourth amendment or the degree of coercion
and abuse with which the police actually con-
ducted the seizure. The majority construed the
misconduct factor as relating to the purpose behind
the seizure. The Court noted that police seized
Dunaway "admittedly ... without probable cause
in the hope that something might turn up."9 The
S Id. at 365.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 491.
9 In Johnson, removing the taint of illegality, and in
Wong Sun, highlighting the circumstances of a free deci-
sion, broke the causal chain.
9' 557 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1977).
-99 S. Ct. at 2259.
Court pointed out that the appellate division's
emphasis on the fact that police did not abuse
Dunaway was misplaced. Thus, the Court implied
that physically unabusive conduct is not a major
factor in the causal-connection test.93
The Dunaway Court's treatment of the miscon-
duct factor of the causal-connection test is consist-
ent with the Brown decision. In Brown, the Court
condemned police for arresting Brown merely for
investigatory purposes.' When the Court deline-
ated the multifactor test in Brown, it cited two cases
in which circuit courts had construed official mis-
conduct to mean a violation of rights. In United
States v. Edmons,95 in order to present certain indi-
viduals for identification purposes in an investiga-
tion, FBI agents arrested the individuals on the
unknown charge of not having Selective Service
cards in their possession. The court held that the
illegal arrests were a pretext for securing evidence
which would otherwise not have been obtained. As
such, the court held that the evidence was obtained
by exploiting an illegal arrest.96 Similarly, in United
States ex. rel. Gockley v. Myers,97 where police had
arrested Gockley on a forgery charge, only to ques-
tion him extensively regarding the disappearance
of two people, the court found that the illegal arrest
was designed to facilitate effective and persistent
interrogation concerning the disappearances. The
court excluded evidence obtained during the inter-
rogation in order to deter such uses of illegal ar-
rests.ss Hence, on the basis of these decisions and
Brown, it appears that the Court in Dunaway in-
tended the misconduct factor in the causal-connec-
tion test to measure the degree to which police
purposefully violated the fourth amendment in
order to secure evidence.
In his dissent in Dunaway, Justice Rehnquist
argued that the factor of official misconduct should
apply to the conduct of police toward the individ-
ual during the seizure. Rehnquist emphasized that
police did not abuse Dunaway. He further con-
tended that since police acted in good faith reliance
on the New York Court of Appeals decision in
People v. Morales,s9 their conduct was not flagrant.
Rehnquist concluded that if police do not act in a
physically coercive manner, a Miranda confession
93 Id.
9' Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 605.
95432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970).
MId. at 584.
97450 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1063 (1972).
9 450 F.2d at 237.




given during a detention later found illegal by a
court should be admissible.
Some support for Rehnquist's position exists in
Brown. Another of the circuit court cases relied on
by the Brown Court utilized the misconduct factor
in the same manner as Rehnquist. In United States
v. Kilgen,I0 after police arrested Kilgen for va-
grancy, they found stolen stamps in his car and
obtained his confession. Since the United States
Supreme Court later declared the vagrancy statute
unconstitutional, Kilgen argued that the stamps
and his confession should be suppressed as fruits of
an illegal arrest. The court rejected this argument,
holding that no legitimate interest would be served
by excluding evidence obtained in good faith while
the statute was still valid.''
The debate between the majority and the dissen-
ters in Dunaway over the meaning of the police
misconduct factor belies a difference in opinion as
to how this factor determines whether the causal
connection between the illegality of the seizure and
the confession has been broken. This difference
turns on the interpretation given to the meaning
of voluntariness.
By holding that the misconduct factor measures
the degree of the fourth amendment violation, the
majority implied that the purpose of the seizure
begins the causal chain. In order to be admissible,
statements made during the seizure must be re-
moved from this illegal purpose. The Court indi-
cated that a statement which is voluntary in the
sense of being given without threat or physical
coercion may not be attenuated from the taint of
illegality because the police have manipulated the
circumstances under which the statement is given.
An individual has no way of knowing whether the
purpose of the seizure is to gain evidence which the
police know is otherwise unobtainable. Thus, even
if an individual freely decides to confess, this free
decision has been manipulated by police who in-
tended all along to acquire incriminating evi-
dence.'0 2 Since this illegal purpose is not manifested
to the seized individual by the actual demeanor of
police, the way in which police treat the individual
is irrelevant in the Court's decision as to the ad-
missibility of illegal detention statements.
'0 445 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1971).
101 Id. at 289.
It is important to note, however, that the Court will
not exclude a statement only because it would not have
been obtained but for the illegal detention. Apparently,
the Court intends for the temporal-proximity and inter-
vening-circumstances factors of the causal-connection test
to help determine the degree of police manipulation.
In contrast, Justice Rehnquist argued that the
police misconduct factor can be used in reference
to the extent of a fourth amendment violation only
when police knowingly undertake such a violation.
Rehnquist implied that when police think they are
acting in conformity with search and seizure law
as interpreted by the courts, and if the courts later
change this interpretation, the actions of police
cannot begin the causal chain. If police do not
know they are acting illegally, presumably they
cannot manipulate a *confession. Thus, Rehnquist
emphasized the actual treatment of the individual
by police. If police do not threaten or abuse an
individual, that individual's decision to confess ;.
voluntary since it is free from both physical com-
pulsion and purposeful manipulation. Rehnquist
therefore argued that such confessions should be
admissible.
When viewed in relation to a specific case, Rehn-
quist's position is both practical and logical. If
police act in good faith reliance on the law, and if
this law is later interpreted differently, how are
police to know that their actions were illegal and
manipulative? But when viewed in relation to a
body of constitutional law which develops by ac-
cretion, Rehnquist's position is too narrow. The
reasonableness of police practices changes over time
through a process of judicial interpretation. Such
interpretation applies an objective standard of
judgment to a set of facts frozen in the past, rather
than the subjective standard of the belief of the
actors involved. These objective criteria are utilized
to shape future conduct. 1°3 Thus, while an individ-
ual prosecution may suffer, as Rehnquist suggested
was the case in Dunaway, the constitutional rights
of individuals become further defined and pro-
tected by the use of objective criteria.
In sum, the Court in Dunaway stressed that state-
ments obtained during an illegal seizure will only
be admissible if the causal chain between the ille-
gality of the seizure and the confession is broken.
In applying the Brown test, the Court did not lessen
the ambiguity inherent in the temporal-proximity
and intervening-circumstances factors of the test.
The Court's discussion of the official-misconduct
factor indicates that this factor measures the degree
to which police conduct violates the fourth amend-
ment, not to the actual demeanor of police while
they conduct the seizure. Since the conduct of
police begins the causal chain between detention
'0ajustice Stevens made this point in his concurring




and confession, the Court has clarified this impor-
tant dimension of the Brown test.
CONCLUSION
In Dunaway, the Court largely relied on prece-
dent to find that police had illegally seized Duna-
way and that his Miranda confession, being insuf-
ficiently removed from the taint of the illegal de-
tention, was inadmissible. In defining custody, the
Court placed new emphasis on the intentions which
police have in detaining an individual. The Court
refused to extend the Terry balance test of reason-
ableness to situations which closely approximate
arrest and distinguished situations in which the
balance test is applicable, holding that probable
cause is the test for seizures made during routine
criminal investigations.
In deciding the admissibility of Dunaway's state-
ments, the Court indicated that it intends to utilize
a multifactor test in determining whether a confes-
sion is attenuated from the taint of an illegal
detention. Although two factors of the test remain
ambiguous, the Court did clarify the official-mis-
conduct factor. This factor is interpreted as refer-
ring to the flagrancy of the police violation of the
fourth amendment, not to the manner in which
the seizure itself is conducted.
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